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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a situation where the United States, the European Union, and
Russia introduced a fee for patent registration that is seven times higher for
foreign than for domestic inventors. All three countries are members of the
2
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), which prohibits such discrimination. The
affected foreign inventor brings a suit in domestic courts in all three countries: in
the United States, the European Union, and Russia, claiming violation of WTO
law. What results? It could be predicted with a great degree of certainty that the
3
U.S. court would dismiss the complaint as prohibited by U.S. law. The E.U.
court would also dismiss the complaint because WTO law, absent a very narrow
4
exception, does not have direct effect within the European Union. As for the
Russian court, it would likely refer to WTO law and invalidate the Russian
5
government’s regulation providing for the offending requirement. Why is there
such a striking difference in the treatment of WTO obligations by the domestic
courts among the member states of the same international organization? The key
to this riddle is in the way that each of the WTO members treats WTO law within
6
its domestic legal order. One major question in this regard is whether WTO law
7
will be given direct effect within the WTO member state’s domestic system.
This question is yet to be settled in Russia, one of the recent members of the
8
WTO.
Russia joined the WTO in 2012 and became its 156th member after 18 years
9
of negotiations. The protocol on Russia’s accession to the WTO was signed in
10
Geneva on December 16, 2011 and took effect on August 22, 2012. The

2. The WTO is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an international agreement
that had regulated international trade since 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.B.1.
4. See infra Part III.C (discussing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to WTO law).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See generally infra Part III (discussing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to WTO law).
7. “Direct effect” or “direct application” in the context of this comment means that WTO law would be
treated by domestic courts and government bodies as a direct source of domestic law. Direct effect could be
given to only the WTO agreements themselves or could be extended to WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and
Appellate Body rulings, or could apply to both. See infra Part III.A.
8. EU Welcomes Russia’s WTO Accession After 18 Years of Negotiations, EUR. COMMISSION (Aug. 22,
2012), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=827.
9. Id.
10. Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k Marrakeshkomy
Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No. 126-FZ [Federal Law of
the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation to Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No. 30, Item 4177; Accessions: Russian Federation,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court (“SAC”) decided the first case based on
WTO law on April 11, 2012 and invalidated a regulation imposed by the Russian
government, which established higher patent registration fees for foreigners in
12
13
Russia. A second similar case was decided on August 28, 2012, only six days
14
after Russia became a WTO member.
At the same time, in Section 151 of the Working Party Report on Russia’s
15
Accession to the WTO, a Russian representative stated that once Russia ratifies
the Protocol of Accession it will become an integral part of her legal system and
“[t]he judicial authorities of the Russian Federation would interpret and apply its
16
provisions.” This statement and the recent jurisprudence of Russian courts
resulted in a heated debate among Russian legal scholars and practitioners,
including justices of its highest courts, as to whether the Russian representative
17
“meant what he said, [a]nd he said what he meant” in the Working Party Report,

11. Until 2014, the Russian federal court system consisted of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation (Constitutional Court), the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (Supreme Court), the SAC,
along with corresponding lower courts of general jurisdiction and lower arbitrazh courts. Federal’nyi
Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Sudebnoi Sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.12.1996 N 1-FKZ [Federal
Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on Judicial System of the Russian Federation of Dec 31, 1996 N1FKZ] art. 4(3) SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection
of Legislation] 1997, No.1, Item. 1 (amended 2014). In this system the SAC was the highest court with
jurisdiction over economic and commercial disputes. See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST.
RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 127 (Russ.) (Repealed 2014). On February 5, 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed
into law amendments to the Russian Constitution and relevant constitutional laws which reformed this system
by consolidating the functions and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the SAC. The reform abolished the
SAC and established a new consolidated Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with jurisdiction over
criminal, civil, administrative, and economic cases. See Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi
Federatsii o Verkhovnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 05.02.2014 N 2-FKZ [Law of the Russian Federation on
Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation on Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of Feb
5, 2014 N 2-FKZ] art. 1(6)-(8), SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No.6, Item. 548; Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii
Izmenenii v Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Sudebnoi Sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 05.02.2014 N
4-FKZ [Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on Amendments to the Federal Constitutional
Law of the Russian Federation on Judicial System of the Russian Federation of Feb 5, 2014 N 4-FKZ] art. 1,
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2014, No.6, Item. 551. Given that the majority of commercial disputes that could involve WTO law
would be heard by lower arbitrazh courts, and, until recently, by the SAC, this paper will mostly focus on past
jurisprudence of the SAC. However, the analysis of the opinions and directives of the Supreme Court are also
highly relevant.
12. Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No.VAS-308/12 ot 11 aprelya 2012 g. [Decision of the
Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No.VAS-308/12 of Apr. 11, 2012].
13. See Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-5123/12 ot 28 avgusta 2012 g. [Decision of
the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-5123/12 of Aug. 28, 2012] (invalidating
another IP related tariff).
14. Accessions: Russian Federation, supra note 10.
15. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORKING PARTY REPORT ON THE ACCESSION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, ¶ 15, WT/ACC/RUS/70 WT/MIN(11)/2 (NOV. 17, 2011) [hereinafter WTO WORKING PARTY
REPORT] .
16. Id. at para. 151.
17. DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 51 (2004).
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and whether Russia thus made a commitment to give WTO law direct effect.
Some of the questions regarding the application of WTO law include whether
private parties can bring suits in Russian domestic courts based on WTO law,
whether the courts can invoke WTO law to decide such cases, whether WTO law
can be used to invalidate Russian law or regulations and decisions of
administrative agencies, whether private parties can be awarded damages for
violation of WTO decisions by Russia, and whether courts can invoke WTO
19
decisions to interpret WTO law and Russian domestic law. Thus, Russia entered
a debate that has been continuing since the inception of GATT—what role
20
GATT/WTO law should be given in domestic legal systems? Some
commentators believe that granting domestic legal effect to WTO law might give
greater protections to the rights of private persons and compel greater compliance
21
with WTO norms by the states. Others believe that giving direct effect to WTO
law and opening domestic courts to WTO-based litigation could be dangerous to
democracy and will put a country applying WTO law directly at a significant
disadvantage vis-à-vis other WTO members and impinge on its sovereignty due
22
to added regulations and obligations under the treaty. In addition, direct
application of WTO law by domestic courts might lead to inconsistent
23
implementation of WTO norms. This could displace the WTO from its role as
principle interpreter of WTO norms and produce a body of confusing and
24
25
conflicting doctrine, thus weakening the WTO legal system.
18. Press Release, SAC Dept. of International Law and Cooperation, News of Int’l Legal Cooperation:
The Implementation of WTO Legal Standards in Judicial Practice (Dec. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.arbitr.ru/int_law_coop/cooperation/72790.html (providing a summary of a conference hosted by the
SAC to discuss application of WTO law by national courts following Russia’s accession to the WTO).
19. See infra Parts IV-V.
20. See Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 67-68 (3rd ed. 2013) (describing ongoing academic debate on whether WTO law should be
given direct effect); see also Antonis Antoniadis, The European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of Reactive,
Coactive and Proactive Approaches, 6(1) WORLD TRADE REV. 45, 45 (2007); Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, The
European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA:
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 71, 104-06 (J.H.H.Weiler ed., 2000); Marco
Bronckers, The Domestic Law Effect of the WTO in the EU—A Dialogue with Jacques Bourgeois, in TRADE
AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU AND BEYOND 240, 240 (Inge Govaere, et al. eds., 2011); Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Less than Zero: The Effects of Giving Domestic Effect to WTO Law, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 279, 279-80
(2008); Alessandra Arcuri & Sara Poli, What Price for the Community Enforcement of WTO Law? (Eur. Univ.
Inst. Dep’t of Law, EUI Working Papers LAW 2010/01, 2010), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/13534/LAW_2010_01.pdf (discussing various issues focused on the varying applications
and effects of WTO law on domestic systems).
21. Van den Bossche & Zdouc, supra note 20, at 67.
22. Id. at 67-68; see also Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 46 (stating that direct
application of WTO law would in effect “deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the
scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners.”).
23. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282; see also Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 45 (stating that giving the
WTO agreements direct effect in the absence of reciprocity from other WTO members could “lead to
disuniform application of the WTO rules.”).
24. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282.
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The WTO does not require its members to give direct effect to WTO law and
leaves it up to the members to decide how they will fulfill their WTO
26
obligations. How any particular member incorporates WTO law in its domestic
system depends on its constitution, tradition, and a number of political
27
considerations. While both the European Union and the United States allow
some of their international treaties to have direct application in their domestic
28
legal systems, they both have denied direct effect to WTO law. This is generally
a result of the structure and unique nature of the WTO in the system of
29
international law, mainly the leeway left to the participating states.
This Comment will explore the reasons and justifications for the United
States’ and the European Union’s reserved treatment of WTO law within their
domestic legal systems, and discuss whether Russia should give WTO law full
30
direct effect. Part II of the Comment briefly describes the WTO system, the law,
31
and its dispute settlement mechanism. Part III reviews monism versus dualism
as an approach to international law, and its application to the WTO law using the
32
European Union and the United States as examples. This section also examines
how the U.S. courts and the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) treat WTO law
33
and WTO rulings. Part IV sets out the Russian constitutional approach to
international law and examines the approaches Russia could take in applying

25. See id.
26. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XVI(4), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. Paragraph 7.72 of December 22, 1999 Panel Report
WT/DS152/R makes it clear that WTO system does not create rights and obligations for individuals and there is
no requirement for direct effect of the WTO law:
Under the doctrine of direct effect, which has been found to exist most notably in the legal order of
the [European Community] but also in certain free trade area agreements, obligations addressed to
States are construed as creating legally enforceable rights and obligations for individuals. Neither the
GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order
producing direct effect. (internal citation omitted). Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not
create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or Members and
their nationals.
PANEL REPORT, UNITED STATES— SECTIONS 301– 310 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, ¶ 7.72, WT/DS152/R
(DEC. 22, 1999) [hereinafter SECTION 301 PANEL REPORT].
27. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 310, 310-13 (1992) (discussing various treaty implementation considerations).
28. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 99
(2d ed. 2006).
29. Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395 (ruling that only those WTO measures
adopted by the EC institutions can be invoked); see also Marco Bronckers, From ‘‘Direct Effect’’ to ‘‘Muted
Dialogue:’’ Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO And Beyond, in VIEWS OF
EUROPEAN LAW FROM THE MOUNTAIN 403, 415 (M. Bulterman et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the relationship
between the European Community and WTO provisions, where the European Community refuses to give direct
effect to WTO law).
30. See infra Part VI.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part III.
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WTO law to its domestic system. Part V then discusses advantages and
35
disadvantages of giving direct effect to WTO law in Russia. Part VI concludes
that although Russia’s Constitution recognizes international treaties as an integral
part of the Russian legal system, direct application of WTO law and WTO
36
rulings in Russia are not fully justified. Russia should find a middle ground in
its approach to reception of WTO law that would allow it to comply with the
37
WTO commitments but would not give WTO law blanket direct effect.
II. THE WTO, THE LAW, AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
The WTO was established in 1995, replacing GATT, in order to provide “a
forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international
38
39
trade.” It currently includes 159 member states. Discussions and decisions of
WTO member states regarding the prospects for further liberalization of world
40
trade are held in the framework of multilateral trade negotiations (rounds). To
date, eight rounds of negotiations, including Uruguay round, were conducted
41
under GATT and the WTO, and in 2001 the ninth round started in Doha, Qatar.
Thus, the WTO body of legal rules is comprised of agreements and decisions
taken in the years 1986-1994 in the Uruguay Round and earlier GATT
42
agreements. These include the Marrakesh Agreement and the series of annexed
agreements and legal instruments dealing with trade in goods, services, and
43
intellectual property rights.

34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part V.
36. See infra Part VI.
37. See infra Part VI.
38. Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., WTO, Statement: About the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). The WTO was
created by a series of treaties known as the Uruguay Round Agreements and under the terms of the “Final Act”
signed in Marrakesh the WTO replaced the GATT on 1 January 1995. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26
(Marrakesh Agreement is also known as the WTO Agreement).
39. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
40. See Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
41. See Timeline: World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_
profiles/2430089.stm (last modified Feb. 15, 2012) (listing the chronology of GATT and WTO events).
42. See Pascal Lamy, supra note 1.
The WTO is a treaty comprising some 500 pages of text accompanied by more than 2,000 pages of
schedules of commitments. Moreover, 50 years worth of GATT practice and decisions—what we
call the “GATT acquis”—have been incorporated in what constitutes the new WTO treaty. WTO
rules are regularly renegotiated.
Id.
43. The annexed agreements include the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, consisting of the
GATT and twelve substantive agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on
Safeguards; the General Agreement on Trade in Services; and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
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Article XVI(4) of the WTO Agreement stipulates that “[e]ach Member shall
ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations[,] and administrative procedures
44
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.” However, as
mentioned above, WTO rules do not require members to give WTO law direct
effect in their domestic legal systems, such that it is applicable to domestic courts
45
and citizens.
The WTO Agreement declares that principle functions of the WTO include
(1) providing “the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the [WTO] agreements”
and (2) administration of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes referred to as “Dispute Settlement Understanding”
(“DSU”), which regulates dispute settlement under all covered WTO
46
47
agreements. The DSU is set out in Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement. The DSU
states that the dispute settlement system “is a central element in providing
48
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” Ultimate
responsibility for settling disputes lies with the Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”), which is comprised of representatives of the member states’
49
governments. The majority of WTO litigation relates to trade remedies,
50
including anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. Although these
issues often concern interests of an individual or a company, the dispute
settlement system of the WTO Agreement is available only to the member states
51
and not private parties. WTO dispute settlement proceedings, with a few
52
exceptions, are confidential. Therefore, the only way for private parties to
contribute to the dispute resolution process at this stage is to submit amicus
53
54
curiae briefs. This practice is becoming popular, especially in cases of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). See generally Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26, at Annex 1. While
the GATT covered only trade in goods the WTO also includes rules covering provision of services and
intellectual property which were included in the WTO Agreement as Annexes 1B and 1C. See id.
44. Id. at art. XVI(4).
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
46. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26, art. III(2-3).
47. Id. at art. III(3).
48. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3(2), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU].
49. See generally id. at art. 3 (listing several general provisions concerning the DSB).
50. See H.E. Elin Østebø Johansen, Chairperson, WTO DSB, Speech on WTO Dispute Settlement Body
Developments in 2011 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/speech
_johansen_13mar12_e.htm (stating that in 2010 and 2011 the majority of the requests for consultation were
related to trade remedies).
51. See DSU, supra note 48, at art. 2.1 (stating that with respect to disputes under covered agreement only
Members can participate in decisions taken by the DSB); see also Sections 301 Panel Report, supra note 26, at
¶ 7.72. (“[T]he GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting
parties or Members and their nationals.”).
52. Johansen, supra note 50.
53. “[A]micus curiae, noun” (Latin: “friend of the court”) “A professional person or organization that is

331

07_WILSON_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:53 PM

2014 / Russia in the WTO
considerable public interest, such as disputes concerning issues of public health
55
and safety, protection of animals, and environmental protection.
WTO litigation can proceed through two forums: before ad hoc dispute
settlement panels (“DSP”) and, on appeal, before the standing Appellate Body
56
(“AB”). After DSB adopts DSP or AB rulings they become a binding legal
57
force within the WTO. If a country does not implement a WTO DSP or AB
ruling, the winning party may in some cases exercise pressure to induce
58
compliance by the losing party by taking countermeasures. One of these
countermeasures is to introduce retaliatory trade restrictions on imports from the
59
other country.
According to Article 3(7) of the DSU, a main goal of the DSB is to secure
the withdrawal by the offending member state of the measures found to be
60
inconsistent with WTO rules. However, it is important to note that judgments of
WTO DSP or AB do not automatically result in invalidation of offending
61
domestic laws. Unlike rulings of domestic courts which can strike domestic
laws and regulations, the WTO DSP and AP reports can only recommend that the
62
offending state bring its laws into conformity with its WTO obligations. If the
state finds that immediate withdrawal of the measures, such as repealing,
amending, or replacing offending domestic law, is impracticable, it may instead
provide temporary compensation pending the withdrawal of the inconsistent
63
measure. Article 22(2) provides that if the offending member state fails to fulfill
its obligation to implement WTO recommendations and rulings within a
reasonable period of time, then it will be required to enter into negotiations with
64
any party that invoked the dispute settlement procedures. This process is
intended to provide a mechanism for negotiating mutually acceptable
65
compensation.

not a party to a particular litigation but that is permitted by the court to advise it in respect to some matter of law
that directly affects the case in question.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 40 (11th
ed. 2004).
54. See Johansen, supra note 50.
55. See id.
56. See DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3 (discussing the structure for dispute resolution).
57. See id. (discussing adoption and implementation of DSB rulings).
58. See CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 239
(2013).
59. John J. Barcelo III, The Paradox of Excluding WTO Direct and Indirect Effect in U.S. Law, 21 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 147, 171 (2006).
60. DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3(7).
61. VANGRASSTEK, supra note 58, at 238-39.
62. Id.
63. DSU, supra note 48, at art. 22(1).
64. Id. at art. 22(2).
65. Id.
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III. WTO LAW IN DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS OF
WTO MEMBER STATES
A. Monism v. Dualism in International Law
Whether any particular international treaty, including the WTO, should have
direct effect in a member state’s legal order depends on the constitutional
requirements, policies, and tradition of the reception of international law by that
66
member state. There are two major approaches to the reception of international
67
law: monistic and dualistic. The dualistic approach views international law and
domestic law as completely different systems and does not allow the norms of
68
international treaties to become a part of the domestic legal system. Hence,
69
there is no direct application or direct effect. Instead, it requires transformation
of international law into national law, usually through the act of its legislative
70
body. When a state accepts a treaty, it has to create national laws explicitly
71
incorporating the state’s obligations under the treaty into domestic order. Only
these newly created domestic laws will give rise to rights and obligations
assumed under the treaty within the domestic legal system and only they can be
72
invoked by private parties and applied by domestic courts. Thus, treaty
73
obligations cannot be directly enforced by domestic courts. If the state’s
domestic laws or acts violate provisions of the treaty, the enforcement could
74
come only via international processes available under the treaty. The monistic
approach, on the other hand, allows international laws to integrate directly into
domestic legal system and even to prevail where domestic laws would be
75
inconsistent. Even if domestic laws are adopted, international law can still be
76
directly applied and adjudicated in national courts.

66. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 90. For a thorough discussion of the place of international
treaties within domestic systems and the policy considerations associated with different models of treaty
implementation see Jackson, supra note 27, at 311.
67. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89; JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND
CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2006). See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (7th ed.2008).
68. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89-90; Jackson, supra note 27, at 313.
69. Jackson, supra note 27, at 314.
70. Bourgeois, supra note 20, at 90-91; JACKSON, supra note 67, at 123; Jackson, supra note 27, at 315.
71. Jackson, supra note 27, at 314.
72. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (7th rev.
ed. 1997).
73. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 314.
74. Id. at 318.
75. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89.
76. How Does International Law Apply in a Domestic Legal System?, THE PEACE AND JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/dualist-and-monist (last visited
Jan. 20, 2014).

333

07_WILSON_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:53 PM

2014 / Russia in the WTO
Each of these approaches has its pros and cons in facilitating states’ relations
77
with international law. The dualistic approach is thought to support the notion
that international law should not interfere with the internal affairs of a sovereign
78
state through direct application. This approach gives the state more freedom and
79
flexibility in dealings with international obligations.
The monistic approach, on the other hand, is believed to promote supremacy,
effectiveness, and respect for international law and supports authority of
80
international treaties. However, in the context of multinational organizations,
monist countries may often find themselves in significant disadvantage vis-à-vis
81
dualist countries. For example, monist countries, by giving direct effect to the
treaty norms, would allow individuals to rely on these norms in bringing actions
82
in their domestic courts in order to invalidate domestic laws or seek damages.
However, this option would not be available in the countries taking a dualist
83
approach under the same treaty. Direct application may restrict the flexibility of
monist countries’ governments and reduce their bargaining power in international
negotiations or lead to significant restrictions in the ability of the government to
84
implement desired domestic policies. At the same time, none of these
restrictions would exist for other members of the same international organization
if they belong to the dualist group of countries that do not give direct effect to
85
international law within their domestic systems. According to Professor John

77. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 310.
78. See JACQUES BOURGEOIS & ORLA LYNSKEY, The Extent to Which the EC Legislature Takes Account
of WTO Obligations: Jousting Lessons from the European Parlament, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL
RELATIONS 202, 205 n.10 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008) (stating that the European
Parliament assumes that denying direct effect to WTO law protects interests of the European community).
79. It allows the state to interpret and tailor the language of the treaty through the act of transformation
for domestic usage or even “preserve the option to breach the treaty in its method of application.” See Jackson,
supra note 27, at 323-26.
80. See Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281.
81. Jackson, supra note 27, at 326-27. Jackson notes that although direct application creates significant
constraints on the state government and creates certain disadvantages, it could be useful in some cases. Id. For
example, this would provide for an effective mechanism to create a strong union of independent states or for
incorporation of international human rights norms into domestic legal systems. See id. It also could be argued
that the monistic approach could help put necessary checks on the state government in order to preserve the
market-oriented economic system of a state with new market economy. See id.
82. See id. at 323-27.
83. According to John Jackson the monistic approach can also result in other difficulties, such as (1) the
power of interpretation of international treaties can shift from the government to the courts, (2) international
interpretations of treaty norms may become binding on domestic legal institutions of these countries, including
their courts, (3) this could create a sort of a supervisory review power by the international organization over
domestic application and interpretation of the treaty norms, (4) the state may find itself bound not only by the
norms of international treaty to which the state subscribed upon accession but also by numerous other
regulations or decisions of adjudicatory bodies of the international organization. These restrictions would be
exacerbated for the states which constitutions require not only direct application of international law but also
provide for supremacy of international norms within domestic legal system. See id.
84. See Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 4.
85. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 315.
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Jackson, this creates an unfair asymmetry in the positions of member states,
which could only be avoided by requiring reciprocity or by restricting direct
86
application of the treaty by the monist member states. Jackson suggests that
87
requirement of reciprocity could be a solution but might create uncertainty.
Furthermore, for some members of multinational organizations it would be
impossible to achieve direct application of international treaties without
88
significant constitutional changes. On the other hand, experience demonstrates
that a monist state faced with the problem of unfair asymmetry is more likely to
89
make adjustments. This can be achieved either via constitutional changes,
through action of domestic courts or other domestic institutions by restricting
90
invocability of the treaty, or by distinguishing between self-executing and non91
self-executing treaties.
Thus, many states have employed a “mixed” monist-dualist approaches to
92
international law, including the European Union and the United States. After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took a strict monist position towards
93
international law, but it appears to be slowly moving towards a more balanced
94
approach. After becoming a WTO member, Russia is facing the same important
95
policy considerations as other monist WTO member states. These policy
concerns should be carefully examined and evaluated in arriving at a conclusion
as to whether WTO law should or would have direct application in Russia.

86. See id. at 326.
87. Id. at 320.
88. Id. at 328 (stating that some states can never permit direct application of international treaties).
89. See id. at 317, 327-28.
90. Id. (stating that invocability can be restricted by a court’s determination as to who is entitled to rely
on the treaty and for what purpose or by establishing requirements for particular parts of the treaty to apply
,e.g., specific and precise language).
91. In most cases direct application of a treaty is possible only for “self-executing” treaties. See Jackson,
supra note 27, at 320.
92. See id. at 320-21.
93. Art. 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution states that “the universally-recognized norms of international
law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal
system.” KONST. RF art. 15(4).
94. 1995 Law on International Treaties of the Russian Federation distinguishes between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15
Iulya 1995 g. [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation],
Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] Apr.
15, 1994], July 17, 1995, No.29, Item 2757. 5.
95. See infra Parts IV-V.

335

07_WILSON_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:53 PM

2014 / Russia in the WTO
B. The U.S. Approach to WTO Law
1. Domestic Effect of WTO Agreements
While the United States allows for some international treaties to have direct
96
effect, it declared WTO law non-self-executing and took a dualistic approach in
97
implementing WTO obligations into the domestic legal system. WTO law is
implemented in the United States via “amending existing federal statutes that
would otherwise be inconsistent with the [WTO] agreements and, in certain
98
instances, by creating entirely new provisions of law.” The Uruguay Round
99
Agreements Act (“URAA”) sets out the relationship of the WTO agreements to
100
101
the U.S. domestic law. This relation consists of three main principles: (1) the
WTO agreements are not self-executing and require implementing legislation
such that only the implementing legislation has the effect of the law in the United
102
States; (2) the U.S. law has supremacy over the WTO agreements and no
provision of the WTO trade agreements inconsistent with the U.S. law will have
103
any effect in the United States and (3) the WTO trade agreements are not a
104
basis for any private right of action and may not be referred to in order to
96. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“International law and
international agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several States.”); id. (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
international agreements of the United States, except that a “non-self-executing” agreement will not be given
effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”).
97. Patrick C. Reed, Relationship of WTO Obligations to U.S. International Trade Law: Internationalist
Vision Meets Domestic Reality, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 209, 214-15 (2006), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.
com/Relationship+of+WTO+obligations+to+U.S.+international+trade+law%3a. . .-a0159280330.
Although
WTO law was expressly pronounced non-self-executing by the Act of Congress, it is possible that the courts
would come to the same conclusion because they could find that WTO agreement “manifests an intention that it
shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation” or that
“implementing legislation is constitutionally required.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111.
98. Reed, supra note 97, at 215.
99. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act is a domestic statue implementing the U.S.’s WTO obligations
arising out of the Uruguay Round agreements. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4808 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
100. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §102(a), 19 U.S.C. §3512(a) (1994).
101. Reed, supra note 97, at 214.
102. MATSUSHITA ET AL, supra note 28, at 94.
103. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (“No provision of any of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”). The Statement of Administrative Action,
which is the “authoritative expression of the United States” on the domestic interpretation and application of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, further emphasize the meaning of section 102(a) as following: “[t]he WTO will
have no power to change U.S. law. If there is a conflict between U.S. law and any of the Uruguay Round
agreements . . . U.S. law will take precedence . . . .” Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of
Administrative Action, H.R. REP. No. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040.
104. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 103(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(A) (“No person other than the
United States—(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or
by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement”).
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“challenge . . . any action or inaction by any federal department [or] agency” as
105
inconsistent with the WTO trade agreement. Clarification of this provision by
the Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) accompanying the URAA is
particularly instructive, stating that:
[S]ection 102(c) represents a determination by the Congress and the
Administration that private lawsuits are not an appropriate means for
ensuring state compliance with the Uruguay Round agreements. Suits of
this nature may interfere with the President’s conduct of trade and
foreign relations and with suitable resolution of disagreements or
106
disputes under those agreements.
2. Domestic Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports
The URAA explicitly determines that WTO dispute reports have no
107
automatic effect on the U.S. law. U.S. Congress will have to act pursuant to
normal legislative processes before any change to the WTO-inconsistent law can
108
be made. Practices of administrative agencies are also shielded from automatic
109
compliance with WTO DSP or AB reports. Instead of immediate correction of
its practice in accordance with the WTO DSP report, the offending agency is not
to make any modifications unless and until the head of the agency and the U.S.
Trade Representative complete consultations with congressional committees and
110
relevant private sector actors.

105. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 103(c)(1), 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1)(B) (“No person other than the
United States—. . . (B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision
of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such agreement.”).
106. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. REP. NO. 103-316,
(1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4055.
107. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 284.
Reports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the DSU have no binding effect under the law
of the United States and do not represent an expression of U.S. foreign or trade policy. They are no
different in this respect than those issued by GATT panels since 1947. If a report recommends that
the United States change federal law to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it
is for the Congress to decide whether any such change will be made.
Id.at 4318.
108. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 284.
109. According to the SAA, “panel reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies to change
their regulations or procedures or refuse to enforce particular laws or regulations” and “neither federal agencies
nor state governments are bound by any finding or recommendation included in such reports.” Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. REP. No. 103-316.
110. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2000).
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3. Application of WTO Law by the U.S. Courts
111

Thus, URAA disallows direct application of WTO law in the United States.
Accordingly, the U.S. courts are precluded from directly relying on WTO law,
112
including WTO DSP and AB rulings. U.S. courts must apply unambiguous
U.S. law that clearly violates WTO norms and disregard WTO agreements and
113
rulings. As discussed earlier, private litigants may not bring actions based on
114
WTO law. Relevancy of WTO law in U.S. domestic litigation then may only
arise in situations where domestic law is ambiguous and allows for several
115
different interpretations.
In such situations, two doctrines of statutory
interpretation come into play, the so called Chevron and Charming Betsy
116
doctrines. Generally, under Murray v. The Charming Betsy (“Charming
117
Betsy”), the U.S. courts should interpret ambiguous federal statutes in a way
that would make them compliant with U.S. international obligations, thus giving
118
international law indirect effect. As it was stated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Charming Betsy, “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
119
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Thus, once the court
has determined that the statute can have more than one interpretation, it should
give preference to the interpretation that is consistent with U.S. international
obligations in accordance with Charming Betsy.
However, the Charming Betsy doctrine is almost never applied when U.S.
courts interpret statutes that could be in violation of WTO law, and particularly
120
WTO dispute settlement rulings. This is in part because U.S. domestic courts
cannot order a U.S. agency to change its interpretation of domestic law or its
121
practice in accordance with WTO DSP or AB rulings. U.S. agencies are
explicitly prohibited from making such changes, outside of specific political
process specified by URAA where the Executive Branch alone has the power to
111. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2
112. See Barcelo, supra note 59, at 148-49.
113. Id. at 151; Jane A. Restani, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is the Charming Betsy
Sinking?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1533, 1544 (2001) (“[I]f the domestic statute is clear, the U.S. court must
apply it as written, whatever the consequences to international considerations and the views of international
organizations”).
114. 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1).
115. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 151. Most such cases would entail challenges to the interpretation of U.S.
trade laws by executive agencies responsible for implementation of these laws. See Dunoff, supra note 20, at
285.
116. Restani, supra note 113, at 1544 (addressing interrelationship between the Chevron and Charming
Betsy doctrines).
117. See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
118. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 155.
119. Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
120. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 153.
121. See id. at 164; see Restani, supra note 113, at 1544 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (1994); 19 U.S.C. §
3538(a)-(b) (1994)).
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122

decide whether to implement WTO rulings. This can only occur after
consultations with certain Congressional committees and interest groups in the
123
124
private sector. At this point then, the Chevron doctrine of statutory
interpretation comes into play. Once the court determines that the statute is
ambiguous as to the intent of the legislator, Chevron requires the court to defer to
any interpretation stated by the federal agency charged with its implementation
125
that the court can find reasonable, even if it is contrary to WTO law. Thus,
where a federal agency interprets a statute in accordance with WTO law, the
court may use Charming Betsy to confirm that the agency’s interpretation is
126
reasonable and should prevail. Yet, where the agency’s interpretation of the
statute and its practice implementing such interpretation are in violation of WTO
law, Chevron will usually trump Charming Betsy, and the court will defer to the
127
agency’s interpretation of a domestic statute.
Chevron and many subsequent decisions emphasized that respect for
separation of powers requires that courts leave interpretation of ambiguous
128
statutes to executive agencies. This is so because agencies operate under the
President, who is accountable to the voters, and thus are more suitable than the
129
courts to make required policy decisions. Additionally, the courts should not
130
impinge on the power of Congress vested in administrative agencies. This
position of U.S. courts is well demonstrated as is seen by the numerous decisions
on the use of “zeroing” by Commerce, where courts found time after time that a
131
domestic statute was ambiguous and deferred to Commerce’s reasonable
132
interpretation of that statute. These decisions uphold use of the “zeroing”
method in calculation of antidumping duties to be imposed on U.S. importers,

122. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g).
123. Id.
124. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
125. Chevron established a two-step test in order to decide whether the agency interpretation of the
statute in questions should be sustained. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-3. The first step requires determination of
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If the court finds that
Congress had a clear intention “on the precise question at issue”, that intention is the law and must be given
effect. Id. at 842-43. If the court finds that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question
at issue, then the court has to decide “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Id. at 843.
126. See, e.g., Fed. Mogul Corp. v. Unites States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
127. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 156.
128. Reed, supra note 97, at 212.
129. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
130. Id. at 865-66.
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (2006).
132. See Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron analysis
to determine that the Dept. of Commerce’s practice of using zeroing in administrative reviews was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute); see Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(extending Timken to encompass Commerce’s practice of zeroing in investigations and emphasizing that
Congress provided for a political process to decide whether to conform U.S. law to a WTO ruling).
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even where the WTO AB found that use of zeroing was inconsistent with U.S.
133
WTO obligations. Two additional considerations provide rationale for keeping
the decisions about WTO compliance within the executive branch and away from
domestic courts. First, as many commentators including Professor John J.
Barcelo III have noted, the WTO DSU provides political mechanisms for
member states to respond to an adverse WTO ruling and is rather ambiguous
about whether a member state has an international law obligation to actually
134
change its domestic law in order to comply with such a ruling. As long as such
uncertainty exists, domestic courts should not interfere with political decisions of
135
the executive branch in its dealings with the WTO.
Second, the wisdom of giving direct or indirect effect to WTO rulings by
domestic courts, particularly those that do not directly involve the United States,
has been questioned by some U.S. commentators on the grounds that WTO
136
dispute settlement rulings do not have firm stare decisis effect.

133. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004); see also Panel Report, United
States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916—Complaint by the European Communities, WT/DS136/R and Corr.1 (Sept. 26,
2000); Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (Aug. 23 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11 2004).
134. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 165.
135. See id. at 165-67.
136. E.g., John D. Greenwald, A Comparison of WTO and CIT/CAFC Jurisprudence in Review of U.S.
Commerce Department Decisions in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 21 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 261, 268 (2013); see DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3(2). For discussion of cases where WTO panels did
not follow Appellate Body decisions, so called “vertical dissent” see Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Horizontal and
Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (2012) and Gilbert Guillaume,
The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETT. 5, 12 (2011).
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C. The European Union Approach to WTO Law
Although the European Union is relatively open to international law, WTO
137
law does not have direct effect in the European Union. In the absence of a
statute, similar to the United State’s URAA limiting direct application of WTO
law within the domestic legal system, the role of the WTO law within the
138
European Union became determined under the jurisprudence of the ECJ.
The ECJ, the highest court in the European Union, developed tests on
whether and when WTO law would have direct effect within the European Union
as it considered cases brought by private litigants attempting to use WTO law to
139
invalidate E.U. law, or to obtain damages under the E.U.’s non-contractual
140
liability provision. With a few narrow exceptions, the ECJ has continually
stated that WTO law does not have direct effect within the European Union and
declined to invalidate E.U. law on the basis of WTO law or to award damages to
141
private entities. This is true even in cases where the WTO DSB declared the
142
European Union’s behavior inconsistent with WTO obligations. An analysis of
ECJ jurisprudence in WTO related cases will help elucidate the reasoning the
ECJ has used in limiting direct application of WTO law in the European Union.
143
The ECJ first invoked a theory of direct effect in the case of Van Gend in
144
1963, when it decided that certain provisions of European Communities law
could be directly applied in the courts of member states to invalidate their law or
145
actions. This case was decided at the beginning of the modern European Union
and allowed the ECJ to pronounce “a new legal order” and set up an initial test

137. See PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL 301 (2005) (stating that there is often a presumption in favor of direct effect of international
agreements, with the exception of the GATT and the WTO agreements); see also Antoniadis, supra note 20, at
45-46.
138. For discussion of ECJ jurisprudence on WTO law see infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
139. Joined Cases 21-4/74, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (International
Fruit), 1972 E.C.R. 1219.
140. E.g., Joined Cases C-120/06 & C-121/06, FIAMM and Fedon v. Comm’n and Council (FIAMM)
2008 E.C.R. I-6513. For analysis of ECJ WTO related cases, including cases brought under non-contractual
liability provisions see generally Bourgeois, supra note 20; Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20; John Errico, The WTO
in the EU: Unwinding the Knot, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 179 (2011).
141. See, e.g., Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395; see, e.g., FIAMM, 2008 E.C.R. I6513.
142. See Errico, supra note 140, at 184.
143. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van Gend en Loos NV v.
Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen (Van Gend ), 1963 E.C.R. 1.
144. At that time the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”), established by the ECSC Treaty in
1952; the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(“Euratom”), created under the Treaties of Rome in 1958. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11[hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
145. See Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
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146

for when the provisions of the EEC Treaty of Rome could be invoked directly
147
before the courts of the member states. In Van Gend, the plaintiff attempted to
148
use Article 12 of the EEC Treaty to invalidate an action of a member state. He
complained that the member state increased tariffs on a chemical—ureaformaldehyde—by reclassifying it into a different category, and that this action
149
violated the provisions of Article 12. The ECJ ruled that provisions of Article
12 created individual rights enforceable in national courts because they
established a “clear” and “unconditional” “negative” obligation of the member
150
states where no further legislative enactment by the member state was required.
Nine years later in International Fruit the ECJ explored whether certain
provisions of GATT law could also have direct effect, or be invoked in a case
151
152
against the Community, before the ECJ. The court answered in the negative.
The ECJ declared that international law, including GATT, could invalidate
Community law only if it satisfied two conditions: first, the provision of
international law must bind the Community; and second, it must be “capable of
conferring rights on citizens of the Community, which they can invoke before the
153
courts.” The Court found that GATT provisions were binding on the European
Community but, after examining “the spirit, the general scheme and the terms” of
the GATT, the ECJ declared that the provisions of the GATT did not confer
rights on citizens of the Community “on which they can rely before the courts in
154
contesting the validity of a Community measure.” This was because the GATT
was “based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements” and due to “great flexibility” of
GATT provisions, “in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation,
the measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the

146. This case was decided only five years after the creation of the EEC in 1958. See EEC Treaty, supra
note 144.
147. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1; see Errico, supra note 140, at 184.
148. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
149. Article 12 of the EEC Treaty states that “[m]ember States shall refrain from introducing between
themselves any new customs duties on imports and exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from
increasing those which they already apply in trade with each other.” EEC Treaty, supra note 144, art 12.
150. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The rights created by Article 12 could have direct effect because, after
examining “the spirit, the general scheme and the wordings” of the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ found that the EEC
created by the Treaty constituted a new legal order of international law where member states limited their
sovereign rights and intended for the Treaty to have direct authority in the member states. Id.
151. International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. I-1219. In this case, an importer of apples challenged several
regulations of the European Commission as violating GATT Article XI which provides that “[n]o prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party. GATT, supra note 2, at
art. XI.
152. Id.
153. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.
154. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 27.
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155

settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties.” Thus, individuals could
not invoke GATT provisions before national courts to examine the validity of the
Community regulations restricting the importation of apples from third
156
countries. In the first case of Bananas, the court confirmed its position in
International Fruit, stating that because the provisions of the GATT did not have
157
direct effect, they could not serve as a criterion for legality of Community law.
After the GATT was transformed into the WTO upon conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, the question about whether
WTO law could have direct effect had to be revisited. The opportunity presented
158
itself in the case of Portugal v. Council. In this case Portugal complained that
the Council’s decision concluding the Memoranda of Understanding with India
and Pakistan on market access for textile products during the Uruguay Round
violated certain provisions of the GATT, the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, the Agreement on Import Licensing and general principles of
Community law such as the principle of transparency, the principle of
159
cooperation, and the principle of legitimate expectations. Although the court
acknowledged that the WTO dispute resolution system was an improvement
compared to the GATT, the Court concluded that it still gave considerable
importance to the negotiations between the parties, allowing for a possibility of
compensation or retaliation against the party whose legislation was found to be
160
inconsistent with the WTO agreements. Thus, the Court held that:
[H]aving regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are
not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to
161
review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions.
In this opinion, the Court further explained its main concerns with the WTO
structure and operations: (1) the lack of reciprocity and (2) the freedom of the
162
political institutions. Reciprocity was a concern because the most important
commercial partners of the Community did not allow their domestic courts to
163
review the legality of their legislation according to WTO law. The freedom of
the political institutions, the other concern of the Court, would be compromised
in two ways had the Court given WTO law direct effect within the Community.
First, “the external aspect”it would weaken the negotiating strength of the
155.
156.
157.
20, at 47.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at ¶ 27.
Id.
Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973, at ¶¶ 105109; see Antoniadis, supra note
Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395.
Id. at ¶¶ 53 et seq.; see Antoniadis, supra note 20, at 48.
Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, at ¶¶ 35-37.
Id. at ¶ 47.
See id. at ¶¶ 40, 46.
See id. at ¶ 45.
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institutions within the WTO and among the trading partnersand second, “the
internal aspect”it would shift the institutional balance in external trade matters
164
from the Council and the Commission to the Court.
The Court took a different approach with bilateral agreements. In
165
Kupferberg the Court held that the EEC—Portugal Free Trade Agreement
166
(“FTA”) had direct effect and could invalidate Community law. After
discussing the purpose and international origin of the agreement, the ECJ stated
that Article 21 of the FTA was sufficiently unconditional and precise and
therefore “directly applicable and capable of conferring upon individual traders
167
rights which the courts must protect.”
Although the Court generally refused to find that GATT/WTO law has direct
effect within the Community system, including its more recent cases such as
168
169
FIAMM in 2008, it did establish two important exceptions: the Nakajima and
170
Fediol doctrines. According to these exceptions, the Court may review the
legality of Community measures in the light of WTO rules only when the
Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed within the
context of the WTO, or where the Community measure expressly refers to the
171
precise provisions of the WTO agreements.
Thus, similarly to the United States, the European Union rejected direct
172
effect of WTO law. However, the ECJ’s approach to WTO law appears to be
more flexible and allows for more opportunities for indirect application of WTO
173
law.

164. See Antoniadis, supra note 20, at 49.
165. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. (Kupferberg) 1982 E.C.R.
3641.
166. Id. at ¶¶ 90-91.
167. Id. at ¶ 23.
168. Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-121/06, FIAMM and Fedon v. Comm’n and Council (FIAMM) 2008
E.C.R. I-6513.
169. Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council (Nakajima) 1991 E.C.R. I-2069.
170. Case 70/87, Fediol v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 1781.
171. See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28; see generally Errico, supra note 140.
172. See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28.
173. See id. In addition to the exceptions allowing for direct application of certain WTO laws, European
courts apply WTO law indirectly when interpreting domestic laws and regulations via principle of consistent
interpretation. This principle requires that the laws of both E.U. and E.U. member states receive interpretations
that are consistent with international obligations. See Antonello Tancredi, EC Practice in the WTO: How Wide
is the ‘Scope for Manoeuvre’?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 933, 940 (2004).
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IV. WHAT IS THE PLACE OF WTO LAW IN RUSSIA?
A. Constitutional Approach to International Law
Russia rejected the traditional dualist approach to the implementation of
international law in a domestic legal system that was prevalent during the Soviet
174
period and proclaimed international law to be part of its domestic law.
International treaties and commonly recognized principles of international law
175
have supremacy within Russian legal system. Russian courts “usually rely on
international law as an additional argument in support of their conclusions based
176
on the applicable constitutional provisions.” In addition, “if there is a real gap
in domestic law, courts may apply international law directly in order to make up
177
for the deficit.” However, application of international law by Russian courts
178
has been difficult. The courts often “encountered serious difficulties in
clarifying methods to be used for ascertaining applicable international law rules,”
which often resulted in arbitrary and sometimes unjustified use of international
179
norms.
Until 1995, the courts made no distinction between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties and often directly applied even vague and broad treaty
rules or principles of international law to justify invalidation of Russian domestic
180
law. In 1995, the Russian legislature took initiative and passed the Law on
181
International Treaties, which differentiated two types of norms. It established
174. See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4) (Russ.) (states
that “the universally-recognized norms and principles of international law and international treaties of the
Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system”); see also GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF][Civil Code] art.7 (Russ.) The Russian Civil Code also provides that the
generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian
Federation shall be an integral part of the Russian legal system and the norms of the treaties should be applied
directly, except in cases where an international treaty requires national legislation. Id.
175. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 15 (4) (Russ.)
(establishing the superiority of the terms of Russian international treaties over the Russian domestic law: “if an
international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules different from the rules prescribed by law, the
rules of the international treaty shall be applied.”). For a thorough analysis of the motivation which Russia and
many other newly formed democracies in Eastern Europe had for favoring direct application and supremacy of
international law see generally Jackson, supra note 27 (arguing that the historical experiences of some countries
could create such a distrust in their governments that the constitution makers would want to abandon a dualistic
approach to international law in order to constrain their government through supremacy and direct application
of international norms, thussecuring protection of human rights and implementation of market-oriented
economic system).
176. Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 51, 62 (1999).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 51.
179. Id. at 62.
180. Id. at 51, 58.
181. See generally Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15 iulya 1995
g. [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation], Sobranie
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that there are “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” norms, stating that only
provisions of international treaties that do not require domestic legislation in
182
order to be applied will operate in Russia directly. “[F]or the other provisions
183
of international treaties domestic acts would have to be adopted.” However, the
1995 law did not provide any guidance on how to identify the non-self-executing
184
treaties, other than if they expressly require adoption of domestic laws. The
Supreme Court then instructed lower courts that self-executing treaties can be
applied directly, while a non-self-executing treaty should “apply, along with the
international treaty . . . the relevant domestic legal act that was enacted for
185
effectuating the provisions of the said international treaty.” This created
additional confusion by requiring the simultaneous application of both domestic
186
and international law.
The next significant step to understanding when international treaties can be
invoked by Russian courts came in 2003 when the Russian Supreme Court issued
a ruling “[o]n Application by the Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Generally
Recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and International Treaties
187
of the Russian Federation.” The ruling for the first time formulated the
attributes of a treaty that can be applied by the courts directly: (1) the treaty has
come into force; (2) it is binding for Russia; (3) it is officially published; (4) its
provisions do not require adoption of domestic laws; and (5) it establishes rights
188
and obligations for the subjects of national law. The ruling also clarified that a
treaty should not be directly applied when, inter alia, the treaty contains any
189
instructions directing member states to amend national laws. In other words,

Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No.29,
Item 2757.
182. Id. at art. 5(1).
183. Id.
184. Id.; see Danilenko, supra note 176, at 65-66.
185. Postanovleniye Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF “O Nekotorykh Voprosakh Primeneniya Sudami
Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii Pri Osushchestvlenii Pravosudiya” ot 31 ortyabria 1995 g., N 8 [The
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Plenary Ruling “On Selected Issues of Application of Constitution of
the Russian Federation by the Courts in the Administration of Justice” Nov. 31, 1995, N 8], ROSSIISKAYA
GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Dec. 28,1995, No. 247. See Danilenko, supra note 180, at 66.
186. Danilenko, supra note 180, at 66.
187. Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF o Primenenii Sudami Obstchey Jurisdiktsii
Obshepriznanykh Printsipov i Norm Mezhdunarodnogo Prava i Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov Rossiskoi
Federatsii ot 10 oktyabrya 2003 g., No. 5 [Russian Federation Supreme Court Plenary Ruling on Application by
the Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Generally Recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and
International Treaties of the Russian Federation of Oct. 10, 2003, No. 5], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.]
Dec. 2, 2003, No. 244 [hereinafter Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5]. Explanations provided in Supreme
Court Plenary Ruling No. 5 are used by both by the Supreme Court and the SAC in their decisions regarding
applicability of specific treaties and norms. See Sergei Yu. Marochkin, International Law in the Courts of the
Russian Federation: Practice of Application, 6 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 329, 330 (2007), available at http://intlchinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/329.full.pdf+html.
188. Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187.
189. Id.
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the courts concluded that the constitutional provision, placing international law
and treaties as an integral part of the Russian legal system and giving them
supremacy over national laws, has limitations, and that not all treaties can be
190
applied directly. At least three of these limitations are similar to the tests
imposed by the ECJ in deciding whether a particular treaty can have direct effect
in the European Union: (1) the treaty is binding, (2) establishes rights and
obligations for the subjects of national law, and (3) the norm in question is not
191
conditioned on adoption of domestic law. The rule that only the treaties that do
not require adoption of domestic laws can be applied by the courts directly is also
somewhat similar to the test applied by the U.S. courts in deciding whether a law
192
is self-executing.
Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5 also shed some light on the status of
193
decisions of adjudicatory bodies of some international organizations. It
confirms that the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) is an
integral part of Russian legal system in accordance with Article 15 of the
194
Constitution; therefore, the decisions of the ECHR are binding for Russia. The
ruling then instructs the courts to consider the decision of the ECHR when
195
interpreting the norms of European Convention. This general understanding of
how and when Russian courts will apply provisions of international treaties is
helpful in the discussion of whether WTO law will have direct effect in Russia.
B. Possible Approaches to Application of WTO Law in Russia
Two recent cases decided by the SAC in 2012 (the Patent Fees Cases) may
help shed some light on how Russian courts see the role of WTO law within the
196
Russian legal system. Both cases were brought by the same businessman from
the Czech Republic who complained that Russia’s patent agency discriminated
against foreign inventors by charging them related to patent registration that were
197
seven times higher than the fees paid by Russian citizens. The SAC found in

190. See Marochkin, supra note 187, at 337.
191. See International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 7-8.
192. Jackson, supra note 27, at 320 (“When [treaty] language is sufficiently precise and indicates that no
further government action is needed to apply the treaty norms, a U.S. court will be willing to conclude that the
treaty is self-executing”); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
111(1) (1987).
193. Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No.5, supra note 187.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-308/12 ot 11 aprelya 2012 g. [Decision of the
Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-308/12 of Apr. 11, 2012] [hereinafter SAC
Decision No.VAS-308/12]; Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-5123/12 ot 28 avgusta 2012
g. [Decision of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-5123/12 of Aug. 28, 2012]
[hereinafter SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12].
197. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196.
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favor of the plaintiff in both cases and invalidated the Russian law that created
198
different rates for foreigners and citizens.
199
The first case invalidating one of the fees was decided in April of 2012,
200
three months before Russia ratified its WTO accession protocol. The second
201
case invalidating several other fees was decided in August of 2012, just a few
202
days after Russia became a WTO member. What is particularly interesting
about these opinions is the SAC’s reasoning and reference to international law,
including the WTO law. While the SAC primarily relied on the provisions of a
203
bilateral treaty between the E.U. and Russia in both cases, it also invoked
204
205
provisions of the WTO law. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(“PCA”) between the European Union and Russia served as a framework for the
206
E.U.-Russia economic and political relations since 1997. The PCA promotes
and regulates trade and investment between the two parties and provides for
207
some specific rights for the citizens of the member states. The court reasoned
that section 98(1) of this treaty, requiring equal access to the administrative
dispute resolution bodies for the citizens of all member states, “clearly”
established “specific” obligations of member states to provide for protection of

198. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12 , supra note 196; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12 , supra note 196.
199. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
200. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k
Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No.
126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian
Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE
ZAKONDATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No.
30, Item 4177.
201. SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196.
202. Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k
Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No.
126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian
Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation]
2012, No. 30, Item 4177.
203. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership Between the European
Communities and their Member States, of one side, and the Russian Federation, of the other side, OJ 1997 L
327/3 [hereinafter Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation].
204. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12,
supra note 196.
205. The EU-Russia PCA uses a unique model that is different from the rules for FTAs set forth in Article
XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS. See PETER VAN ELSUWEGE, THE FOUR COMMON SPACES:
NEW IMPETUS TO THE EU-RUSSIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP? 334, 335-41 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau
eds., 2008).
206. Regions and Countries: Russia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countriesand-regions/countries/russia/ (last updated May 3, 2013). (“The new EU-Russia Agreement—currently under
negotiation—should provide a comprehensive framework for bilateral relations with stable, predictable and
balanced rules for bilateral trade and investment relations. It will focus on improving the regulatory
environment by building upon the WTO rules and strengthen bilateral trade relations.”).
207. Id.
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208

the rights of the citizens of both countries without discrimination. Therefore,
209
the court determined that the PCA had direct application in Russia. Because
Russia’s offending regulation required higher fees for foreigners to bring their
grievances to the Chamber of Patent Disputes, it was in direct conflict with
210
provisions of Russian international treaty and was therefore held invalid.
It should be noted that the same treaty was directly applied by the ECJ
several years earlier in the Simutenkov case, brought by Russian citizens alleging
211
discrimination in the workplace. In that case, the ECJ concluded that Russian
workers legally employed in an E.U. member state could directly invoke the
PCA’s non-discrimination provision regarding conditions of their employment,
212
remuneration, or dismissal as provided in Article 23 of the PCA. Thus, both the
Russian SAC and the ECJ directly applied the norms of this bilateral treaty in the
213
domestic legal systems. Both courts focused their analysis on whether the
invoked provision was sufficiently clear and precise, and whether it conferred a
214
specific right upon which a citizen may base a claim. This approach appears to
215
be similar to the ECJ’s approach in Van Gend, resulting in direct application of
the provision of the Treaty of Rome (European Community Treaty) in the court
of a European Community member state to invalidate the actions of another
216
member state. It is also similar to the ECJ’s approach in Kupferberg, which
217
resulted in direct application of the norms of a bilateral agreement. The SAC
also specifically addressed the reciprocity of the obligations provided for in the
218
PSA article 98(1). The SAC noted that Russian citizens will be provided the
same level of protection in the European Union under this section as the citizens
219
of the E.U. members are given in Russia. This appears to be an important
consideration in the SAC’s decision that the PSA article 98(1) has direct effect in

208. “Clearly and specifically” [chetko i konkretno]. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
209. Id.; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196.
210. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12,
supra note 196.
211. Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de
Fùtbol, 2005 E.C.R. I-2579. See generally Christophe Hillion, Competence Distribution in EU External
Relations After ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?, 46 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 815 (2008)
(providing an annotation of this judgment).
212. See VAN ELSUWEGE, supra note 205, at 340.; see FRANCIS C. JACOBS, DIRECT EFFECT AND
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE RECENT CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 13, 19-21 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau
eds., 2008).
213. Simutenkov, 2005 E.C.R. I-2579; SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
214. Id.
215. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
216. Kupferberg,, 1982 E.C.R. 3641.
217. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Kupferberg,, 1982 E.C.R. 3641.
218. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, supra note 203.
219. SAC decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196.
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220

Again, this consideration of reciprocity corresponds with ECJ
Russia.
jurisprudence on whether WTO law can be given direct effect in the domestic
221
legal system. Neither the reciprocity requirement nor the clarity of the specific
rights conferred by the treaty represent criteria for direct application of
international law as it has been discussed in Russian laws or past explanations of
222
higher courts. This appears to be a new line of reasoning surprisingly similar to
223
that of the ECJ when dealing with WTO law.
What is even more surprising is that the SAC did not stop its analysis with
224
applicability of the PSA in the patent fee cases. Rather, the SAC went further
225
and invoked the WTO law. The court stated:
In addition, one of the fundamental principles of the WTO . . . is a
prohibition of discrimination, which follows from the provisions of the
GATT 1947 (preamble and paragraph 1 Article 3), and, in relation to
intellectual property, from the TRIPS agreement, adopted in 1994 during
the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides that the state should provide the citizens of other countries with
the same level of rights in relation to the protection of intellectual
226
property, which it provides to its own citizens.
This may appear diametrically different from the ECJ’s position in cases
involving WTO agreements where the ECJ continually refused to directly apply
227
WTO norms. However, at closer examination, the position of the ECJ and the
SAC may be not very different. First, at the time the SAC invoked WTO law it
was clearly not binding for Russia, as Russia’s accession to the WTO was not yet
228
ratified. This discussion of WTO law by the SAC may be seen more as a
220. Id.
221. See e.g., Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. ¶¶ 43-45; see Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 3; Marco Bronckers,
The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 443, 444 (2005).
222. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15 Iulya 1995 g. [Federal
Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] Apr. 15,
1994] 1995, No.29, Item 2757.5; see Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187.
223. See supra Part III.C.
224. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12,
supra note 196.
225. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
226. Id.
227. See supra Part III.A.
228. Compare SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196 with Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii
Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob Uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy
Organizatsii ot 15 aprelya 1994 g. No. 126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol
of Accession of the Russian Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2012, No. 30, Item 4177. The SAC decision in this case was issued on Apr. 11, 2012, but Russia’s
protocol of accession to WTO came into force only on Aug. 22, 2012. See supra note 10.
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gesture indicating that Russia is willing to be bound by its WTO commitments,
229
rather than a real basis for the decision in this case. Second, invoking the WTO
law in this case allowed the SAC to reveal one of the new tests for direct
application of WTO law, which is similar to the test used by the ECJ in
230
Nakajima. At the time the SAC was deciding this case, the Russian government
had already published a new version of the regulation on patent registration fees
that was in compliance with Russia’s WTO obligations and eliminated all
231
discriminating fees. The regulation was to take effect upon Russia’s ratification
232
of the WTO accession protocol. The SAC referred to this regulation as
evidence that the Russian government explicitly intended to implement its
233
particular WTO obligation. Just as the ECJ decided in Nakajima, the SAC
reasoned that the WTO law was directly applicable because there was an explicit
234
intent by the Russian government to implement a specific WTO obligation.
It remains to be seen what importance this argument will play in future cases.
It is probably too early to conclude that the WTO law will not have direct effect
where there is no indication of direct intent by the government in regard to a
235
particular WTO norm. However, it is clear that in this case the court avoided
discussing whether the WTO agreement was self-executing and whether it
236
confered specific rights on individuals. Had this discussion taken place, the
court would probably have found that Russia in fact adopted numerous new laws
in the process of WTO accession negotiations in order to bring national law in
237
compliance with its WTO obligations. This could then be the end of the
analysis because the Court could find that obligations of member states to amend
238
national laws would “deem direct application of that treaty impossible.” Why
then did the Court invoke the WTO law but avoided any discussion of whether it
239
required adoption of domestic laws or conferred the rights on individuals?
Finding WTO law non-self–executing would completely divest Russian courts of
240
the ability to directly apply any of the WTO law provisions. However, the court
appears to be eager to pronounce that it supports the principles of the WTO law

229. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
230. See id.; see Nakajima, 1991 E.C.R. I-2069.
231. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii of Sept. 15, 2011, No 781[Regulation of the
Government of the Russian Federation] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2011, No. 39, Item 5487.
232. Id.
233. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
234. Id.
235. Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18.
236. See generally SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
237. See WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15.
238. See Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187.
239. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
240. See supra Part IV.A.
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241

and is ready to promote Russia’s image as a compliant state. Its initial rulings
on the topic indicate that it is steering away from the U.S. approach of complete
242
bar for direct application of WTO law. Instead, it appears to be paving the way
towards the model where the courts could analyze specific provisions of WTO
law; they then could pick and choose which of them would be directly or
243
indirectly applicable in Russia. This model resembles the ECJ’s, approach to
WTO lawgenerally rejecting it direct application, but allowing for
244
exceptions.
V. ADVANTAGES AND DISATVANTAGES OF GIVING DIRECT EFFECT
TO WTO LAW IN RUSSIA
This Section discusses the policy considerations that Russia will have to
address in deciding how to apply WTO law within its domestic legal order.
A. Disadvantages of Direct Effect
The dangers of giving direct effect to WTO law are extensively described in
245
246
literature. One of the major concerns includes lack of reciprocity. The ECJ, in
rejecting direct effect to WTO law on numerous occasions, stressed that none of
247
the E.U.’s major trading partners gave WTO law direct effect, and that giving
248
direct effect unilaterally would be detrimental to the E.U.’s interests. As A.G.
Tesauro put it:
[I]n the absence of reciprocity, to recognize that the provisions in
question have direct effect would place Community traders in a
disadvantage compared with their foreign competitors. While the latter
would be able to invoke provisions in their favour directly before the
courts of the Member States, Community traders would be unable to do

241. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.
242. See supra note 198-242 and accompanying text.
243. See Bronckers, supra note 29, at 406.
244. Professor Marco Bronckers has noted that European Courts apply the principle of “treaty-consistent
interpretation” to WTO agreements, which allows them to interpret national regulations “as much as possible in
conformity with WTO law” without giving it direct effect. Id.
245. See, e.g., Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 3-8; see also supra Part II.A. See generally Dunhoff, supra
note 20.
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. The European Union’s major trade partners include the United States and Japan. Directorate General
for Trade. Client and Supplier Countries of the EU27 in Merchandise Trade (value %) (2012, excluding intraEU trade), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 12, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_122530.pdf.
248. See supra Part III.C.
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likewise in the States that refused to recognize that the provisions of the
249
WTO agreement may have direct effect.
250

The same concern would apply in the case of Russia. If Russian courts
would allow foreign businesses to bring suits based on direct application of WTO
law and award damages in cases of Russia’s incompliance with WTO rules,
Russia would find itself compensating competitors of Russian businesses, thus
251
giving them competitive advantage. At the same time, Russian businesses
would never be able to protect their interests against violations by other WTO
member states in their domestic courts since they do not give direct effect to
252
253
WTO law. This would create an uneven playing field for Russian businesses.
A second important consideration involves the nature of the WTO
agreements and its Dispute Settlement System. This system is political in nature
254
and accords considerable importance to negotiations between the governments.
Domestic courts could interfere in the settlement process by providing remedies
inconsistent with those envisioned by the Russian government, potentially
hindering the use of negotiated arrangements to remedy alleged violations within
255
the WTO system. Direct application would then cause the Russian government
to have less bargaining power and flexibility than other WTO members in
negotiating its policies and finding appropriate and mutually acceptable
256
solutions. Furthermore, WTO law might encroach upon the decision making
power of the Russian state with regard to many Russian regulations and policies,
257
thus, interfering with Russia’s autonomy.
249. See Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at n.28 (citing AG Tesauro opinion in Case C-53/96, Hermes Int’l
v. FHT Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-3603).
250. Id.
251. See supra Part III.A. It is also important to consider that WTO rulings, as opposed to domestic court
rulings, are prospective in nature and do not award any compensation for past misconduct of the offending state.
See EECKHOUT, supra note 137, at 305.
252. For example, the United States does not allow private lawsuits based on WTO law. See Barcelo,
supra note 59, at 148-49.
253. See EECKHOUT, supra note 137, at 305.
254. See, e.g., Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 36-42.
255. See, e.g., id.
256. Schwartz and Sykes point to three aspects of the DSU which allow Member states to deviate from
their commitments under the WTO: (1) provisions giving states a reasonable time to correct WTO-inconsistent
problems, (2) provisions permitting compensation or the suspension of concessions instead of changing
behavior, and (3) compensatory nature of sanctions for non-compliance. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O.
Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System 15 (Law
Sch. U. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 143 (2d Series)), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/143.AOS_.wto_.pdf. If Russia was to give WTO law direct effect it
would be more bound by this law than other WTO Member states. See generally id.
257. See Bronckers, supra note 29, at 405 (discussing similar concerns in the E.U.); see also JACKSON,
supra note 67, at 70-76 (providing a more detailed discussion of sovereignty and policy concerns in the US);
see also Paul G. Hare, Russia and the World Trade Organization 14 (Russian-European Centre for Economic
Policy, Working Paper Series, July 2002), available at http://www.recep.ru/phase4/en/rp/harewtoe.pdf (noting
that Russian population perceives WTO accession as “foreign interference in Russian economic policies”). See
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Finally, if WTO law is given direct effect, then the many hundreds of courts
in the Russian court system would be involved in the process of application and
258
interpretation of WTO law. Because most Russian judges do not have
experience in or knowledge of WTO law, these courts would likely produce a
259
volume of inconsistent interpretations. In addition, domestic courts would often
260
be confronted with issues that had not yet been addressed by the WTO DSB.
261
For example, there are few cases addressing disputes on trade in services.
Cases such as these would require that domestic courts interpret WTO law ahead
262
of the WTO DSB.
263
These concerns cannot be disregarded. Some observers and scholars argue
that “the supposed benefits of giving domestic effect to WTO dispute reports are
264
largely illusory, while the potential costs are substantial.”
B. Advantages of Direct Effect
Illusory or not, there are advantages to having WTO law directly enforceable
in Russia by Russian courts. First, it is expected that Russia’s accession to the
WTO will help improve business climates within the country and attract foreign
generally Jackson, supra note 27.
258. In 2012, there were 2,198 district courts and 83 regional courts within the system of the courts of
general jurisdiction. See A.V. Gusev, Otchotnyy Doklad General’nogo Direktora Sudebnogo Departamenta pri
Verkhovnom Sude Rossiyskoy Federatsii Guseva A.V. VIII Vserossiyskomu s”yezdu Sudey, SOVET SUDEY RF,
http://www.ssrf.ru/page/9253/detail (last visisted Mar.11,2014). There are also 81 courts of the first instance, 20
appellate courts, 10 regional courts, and one Intellectual Property Court within the system of the arbitrazh
courts. Struktura Srbitrazhnoy Sistemy RF, VYSSHIY ARBITRAZHNYY SUD RF, http://arbitr.ru/as/assys/struct
(last visisted Mar.11,2014).
259. A few decisions of lower courts that addressed applicability of WTO law so far have pointed in
different directions. Some courts decided that WTO law should be applied but came to the opposite conclusions
while applying the same WTO norms. Other courts refused to apply WTO law concluding that relevant norms
were not directly applicable because they required further domestic legislation. See e.g. Postanovleniye FAS
Moskovskogo Okruga ot 05.12.2013 N F05-15399/2013 po delu N A40-22353/2013 [Decision of the Federal
Arbitrazh Circuit Court for Moscow Circuit N F05-15399/2013 in case N A40-22353/2013 of Dec. 5, 2013
(finding that increase of price on Apatite by the seller was justified in accordance with the new government
regulation promulgated in order to comply with Russia’s WTO commitments and confirming reversal of the
decision of the court of first instance which concluded that WTO law precluded such an increase);
Postanovleniye Suda po intellektual’nym pravam ot 06.09.2013 po delu N A41-24588/2012 ”O zashchite
isklyuchitel’nykh prav ispolniteley i izgotoviteley fonogramm, vzyskanii kompensatsi” [Decision of the
Intellectual Property Court in case N A41-24588/2012 “About Exclusive Rights of Performers and Phonogram
Producers, Award of Compensation” of Sept. 6, 2013] (finding that Russia’s WTO commitment to change its
system of collective management of copyright and related rights to eliminate non-contractual management of
these rights by collecting societies did not have direct effect). At this point there is no official source for WTO
law in Russian language. See Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18.
260. See, e.g., Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A8#selected_agreement.
261. To date there were only 23 cases which cited GATS in the request for consultations. See id.
262. See, e.g., id.
263. E.g., Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282.
264. Id.
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265

investment. The Russian government has long stressed the need for Russia to
266
make the transition from commodity-based to innovation-based development
267
268
by introducing targeted reforms. Yet, Russia’s business climate remains poor.
The World Bank reported that, while conditions have improved over the past few
years, Russia remains among the lower-ranked countries for doing business—at
269
number 120 out of 183 countries. As was noted by many observers, failure by a
270
state to establish a predictable rule-based system will halt investment and trade.
By becoming a WTO member, Russia has committed to bring its trade laws and
271
practices into compliance with WTO rules. Improving business climate and
transparency, as required by the WTO, would not only help to promote trade and
bring Russia much needed foreign investments, but would also benefit Russian
272
businesses and the foreign investors. The trade system promoted by the WTO is
composed “mostly of individual economic operators” and therefore “[i]t is
through improved conditions for these private operators that Members benefit
273
from WTO disciplines.”
Giving the courts a greater role in monitoring government actions and
enforcing WTO rules that benefit private operators would help improve the
business climate in Russia and would give a clear signal to investors that Russia
274
is now a better place for business. Giving direct effect to the WTO law within
Russia would empower individuals to invoke WTO law in Russian courts to
275
recover damages or to invalidate inconsistent domestic regulations. These
276
actions could serve as a vehicle to enhance compliance with WTO norms.

265. See Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, After WTO Accession: Reform and EURussia Trade Relations, Address at the Seminar of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe/ Brussels
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2012/december/tradoc_150139.pdf (stating
that a more predictable regulatory environment will help the many European companies who trade with, and
have invested in Russia).
266. See Robert Bridge, Putin Releases Manifesto for Economic Revival, RT (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:49 PM),
http://rt.com/politics/putin-russia-new-economy-005/.
267. Mario Cervantes & Daniel Malkin, Russia’s Innovation Gap, OECD OBSERVER, http://www.
oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/554/Russia_92s_innovation_gap.html. (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
268. Id.
269. Stefan Wagstyl, World Bank to Russia: Reform or Lose Full Benefits of WTO Membership,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/03/27/world-bank-torussia-reform-or-lose-out-on-the-full-benefits-of-wto-membership/#axzz2HWLMtcCP.
270. See, Stuart S. Malawer, The U.S. and the WTO: Lessons Learned for Trade Litigation and Global
Governance, VIRGINIA LAWYER 15 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/
apr03/malawer.pdf.
271. See WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15 (discussing the changes and amendments to Russian
law in compliance with WTO obligations).
272. Alexey Portansky, Rossia Dolzhna Stat Aktivnym Igrokom v VTO, PROMROS (Dec. 2012),
http://www.promros.ru/magazine/2012/dec/aleksej-portanskij-rossiya-dolzhna-stat-aktivnym-igrokom-v-vto.phtml.
273. Appellate Body Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 7.77; see Errico, supra note 144, at 200-01.
274. Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18.
275. Contra Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281;.
276. Contra Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281.
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Furthermore, it could advance predictability and certainty of business climate in
277
Russia.
Giving WTO law direct effect would give Russian national courts a greater
278
role in the system of government. Although such reallocation of power to
279
courts with regard to WTO law is often viewed as disadvantageous, it could
have some positive effect in Russia by injecting a body of WTO law and WTO
280
DSB cases and doctrines directly into the Russian courts. This might bring a
new framework and more sophisticated tests for resolution of business disputes
281
by Russian courts. On the other hand, Russian courts have been repeatedly
282
accused of “telephone justice” and corruption. The high-stakes WTO-related
trade disputes could push them further into overtly political or policy-based
decision-making mode by making them more susceptible to the pressure from the
283
government. This would be particularly damaging to Russia’s reputation if
resolution of WTO law based disputes in Russia’s national courts comes to be
seen as politically motivated and unjust. Various WTO member states, such as
the United States, would most certainly use Russian courts as a means of
284
bringing Russia into compliance. There are other, more benign, options for
Russia to uphold WTO principles and norms and improve the quality of its
285
domestic courts without pronouncing direct effect of WTO law. As discussed
286
earlier, the ECJ’s approach to WTO law would probably work best for Russia.
In addition, Russia also should consider the U.S. model of employing a vigorous
287
political process for compliance with WTO law.

277. See id.; see Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System, Cornell Law
School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (Apr. 3, 2004),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/1.
278. Bronckers, supra note 20, at 240.
279. For discussion of the U.S. position as to the allocation of power between the branches of government
in regard to WTO law see supra Part III.B.3. For discussion of the ECJ approach see supra Part III.C.
280. See, e.g., WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15.
281. See Malawer, supra note 270, at 15-16.
282. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, ‘Telephone Law’ and the ‘Rule of Law:’ The Russian Case, 1 HJRL 241,
241 (2009), available at https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/nmytc/telephone_law_and_rol.pdf.
283. Bronckers, supra note 20, at 240.
284. The United States law repealing Jackson-Vanik and extending permanent normal trade relations
(“PNTR”) to Russia also serves as a tool to monitor Russia’s compliance with U.S. conditions. See Russia and
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, 19 U.S.C. §
2101 (2012); U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Speech on the Senate floor, December 5, 2012. It requires inter alia that
the U.S. Trade Representative report annually on Russia’s compliance with its WTO intellectual property rights
obligations and that the Representative and the Secretary of State report to Congress annually on their efforts to
promote the rule of law and U.S. investment in Russia. It also requires that the Secretary of Commerce assist
U.S. business to battle corruption in Russia and “to devote a phone hotline and secure website to allow U.S.
citizens and business to report on corruption, bribery and attempted bribery in Russia and to request the
assistance of the U.S. Government if needed.” See id.
285. See supra Part III.C.
286. See supra Part III.C.
287. See supra Part III.B.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The unique structure and distinct dispute resolution system of the WTO
involves diplomatic methods and applies to member states rather than to
288
particular individuals or organizations. This makes it difficult to apply WTO
law directly within a domestic legal system without causing a disturbance in the
delicate balance of trade policies and uniformity of the WTO law, or without
289
creating an unequal playing field for businesses in the competing states.
After joining the WTO, Russia is facing a dilemma with regard to the
290
applicability and effects of the WTO law within its legal system. The Russian
Constitution generally prescribes that international treaties become an integral
291
part of the Russian legal system. However, whereas the other WTO members
do not give WTO law direct effect, and while the WTO itself does not require
direct application of its law by the signatory states, such unconditional and
292
unilateral direct application of WTO law in Russia is not justified. To address
these concerns, Russian courts should further develop already existing legal
mechanisms that would bar blanket unilateral direct application of WTO law in
293
Russia.
Although direct application of WTO values and principles would have
certain advantages for Russia that could prove beneficial for the development of
the Russian legal system, and for improvement of its business climate and image,
Russia should be mindful of the real disadvantages that come with direct
294
application of WTO law. Russia’s higher courts should proceed very carefully
and draw from the experience of older WTO members as they develop
295
mechanisms and tests for sorting out how and when to apply WTO law.
The U.S. and the E.U. models represent two different approaches toward
296
domestic application of WTO law. While the U.S. dualistic approach almost
completely precludes any direct application of WTO law, and relies almost
exclusively on the political process for implementation of the WTO obligations
297
within the United States, the E.U. model functions slightly differently.
Although it generally denies direct effect of WTO law, the E.U. model allows the
288. See supra Part II.
289. Jackson, supra note 27, at 312; Barcelo, supra note 59, at 148-49.
290. See supra Parts IV.B, V.
291. See supra Part IV.A.
292. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 338-40; see Barceló, supra note 59, at 148-49. As noted by Jacques
Bourgeois at least one proposal was made during Uruguay Round to require members to give WTO law direct
effect but the proposal was not supported by major negotiating parties and was dropped. See Bourgeois, supra
note 20, at 109.
293. See supra Part IV.A.
294. See supra Part V.
295. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
296. See supra Parts III.A-C.
297. See supra Parts III.B-C.
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courts to review specific WTO norms and decide whether an exception for direct
298
effect of WTO law could be applicable.
The experience of the ECJ could be particularly helpful as the European
Union is Russia’s main trade partner and Russia shares a monistic approach and
299
civil law tradition with many of the E.U. members. Russia should consider
following the ECJ approach by denying direct effect to the WTO norms with
300
some exceptions, such as ECJ’s Nakajima exception. On the other hand, Russia
should also borrow from the U.S. experience in developing a more robust
political process for implementation of WTO obligations and the protection of
301
Russian business interests. This approach would allow Russia to reap the
benefits of WTO law within the domestic system without opening itself to
302
disadvantages of giving it full direct effect.

298. See supra Part III.C.
299. “Russia is the third trading partner of the E.U. and the E.U. is the first trading partner of Russia.”
Regions and Countries: Russia, supra note 206.
300. See supra Part IV.B.
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. See supra Part III.B.
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